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I. Introduction 
In the last five years the delivery of medical services in the United States has changed 
dramatically. Rather than moving in the direction of increased regulation, market 
competition has now become the dominant force affecting hospitals and health 
professionals. 
For-profit hospital chains have purchased University teaching hospitals. Hospitals 
are advertising and health professionals are taking short courses on how to market 
their practices. Hospitals are experiencing dramatic declines in their occupancy and 
the number of hospital mergers are increasing. After years of concern over shortages of 
physicians, dentists, and nurses, hospitals are laying off nurses and there is concern 
that current surpluses of health professionals will continue for the next 20years. These 
changes were not anticipated. 
The purpose of this paper is to address three questions: 
1. Why did these changes occur? The US. health care system was highly regulated 
and conventional wisdom assumed a continuation of these trends. The change from 
regulation to market competition is also of academic interest [l]. The economic 
motivation of existing providers was to maintain the status quo; market competition 
threatens their economic well being. In such circumstances change is unlikely to occur. 
2. Once free of regulatory constraints, how is the structure of the medical care system 
in the U.S. likely to evolve? 
3. What are the implications of market competition for the public, as well as for 
providers? 
The following is a brief overview of the paper. 
The emergence of market competition was primarily a result of private sector forces. 
However, several actions by the government, both intentional and unintentional, 
aided the movement toward competition. Second, innovations in the medical care 
delivery system are still occurring and it is too early to say what the structure of the 
medical care system will look like in 10 years. However, consumer preferences for 
different delivery systems and large economies of scale appear to be important 
determinants of this evolving structure. Lastly, market competition is forcing a 
redistribution of incomes, both between providers as well as between providers and 
taxpayers. There is also increasing concern over the plight of the medically indigent, as 
inadequate government payments become more obvious in a price competitive system. 
II. The U.S. medical system before market competition 
A. The goal of increased access to medical care 
In 1966 the Medicare and Medicaid programs started. Medicare is a federal program 
to finance the medical costs of the elderly. The benefits and beneficiaries are well 
defined. Under Medicaid the individual states determine the benefits and the eligibility 
requirements for those considered to be medically indigent. The federal government 
assists the states in paying for programs to the medically indigent. 
3 
To ensure that hospitals and physicians participated in these public programs, the 
federal and state governments paid hospitals according to their costs (plus 2 percent 
under Medicare) and paid physicians fee-for-service according to their usual and 
customary fees. 
As a result of Medicare and Medicaid, the aged and the medically indigent increased 
their use of hospitals and physicians [2]. 
The private sector at this time was also increasing demand for medical services. The 
U.S. economy was growing and unions bargained for increased health benefits. (Most 
private health insurance is provided through the workplace thereby decreasing the 
concern with adverse selection.) In the late 1960s inflation began increasing as the 
Johnson Administration decided to finance the Vietnam War in as indirect a manner 
as possible. 
Inflation served to further stimulate the demand for health insurance. Incomes 
increased because of inflation and people moved into higher income tax brackets. 
Employees preferred to receive health insurance as a fringe benefit, since fringe 
benefits were not taxed. The tax advantages of having the employer purchase health 
insurance increased as the employees’ income rose and they moved into higher 
marginal tax brackets. 
As insurance coverage in the private sector increased, concern with health care costs 
diminished. Further, there was only limited competition among third party payers in 
the private sector. The Blues received a competitive advantage over the commercials in 
that they received large discounts from the hospitals (which provided their initial 
capital and controlled them). Also certain unions, such as the United Automobile 
Workers, would not contract with commercial insurers. 
With the increase in insurance coverage, from both the private and government 
sectors, an “erosion of the medical marketplace” began [3]. Out-of-pocket medical 
prices diminished and providers were able to sharply increase their prices with little 
fear of diminished demand. Health insurance premiums increased. Unions, however, 
were able to pass these increased costs on to the employer and were able to still bargain 
for additional benefits. With a growing economy and increased inflation, it was 
possible for business firms to increase the prices of their goods and services. 
There was a great deal of satisfaction with the health care system during this period. 
The aged and the poor received increased access to mainstream medical care. The 
Congress always voted in favor of increased health expenditures, for medical research, 
for increased benefits under Medicare, inclusion of new beneficiary groups under 
Medicare, and for expansion of health manpower training programs. Expansion of 
health programs was politically popular. 
During this period, physicians had the medical responsibility for the care of their 
patients, but not the fiscal responsibility. Each provider was paid separately. Physi- 
cians had the financial incentive to provide more services since they were paid 
fee-for-service. Hospitals were reimbursed, for the most part, according to their costs 
and their incentive was to expand their services so as to emulate large teaching 
institutions. Hospitals competed, but it was for physicians and prestige. There was 
little insurance coverage for out-of-hospital services. 
The determinants of market structure were provider preferences and regulation. 
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Small and large hospitals with little used facilities and services were able to survive and 
even grow. Physicians were able to remain as solo practitioners or join groups 
according to their preferences. State Practice Acts placed limits on the tasks permitted 
to different health professions. Advertising was considered to be unethical and banned 
by medical societies or incorporated into the Practice Acts, as were sanctions on 
fee-splitting and prohibitions against the corporate practice of medicine, e.g., prepaid 
health plans. 
B. The pressures for change 
The large increases in demand from both the public and private sectors together with 
the declining portion of the bill paid for by the patient led to rapidly rising prices and 
expenditures for medical services. Those services most covered by insurance coverage, 
such as hospital care, increased most rapidly. Out-of-pocket payments by the public 
for all medical services declined from 52% in 1965 to 27% in 1984 [4]. For hospital care 
the decline in the portion of the bill paid out-of-pocket was even greater, falling to less 
than 10%. 
The consequence was that federal expenditures increased from an annual rate of 
$3.6 billion in 1965 to $31.4 billion by 1975 and to more than $100 billion by 1984. State 
expenditures under Medicaid also increased sharply, from $4.3 billion in 1965 to $35 
billion in 1984. While expenditures in the private sector went from $28 billion a year in 
1965 to $210 billion by 1984, the more rapid increase in public expenditures (federal 
and state) increased the overall portion of the health sector that was paid for by public 
funds, from 22% in 1965 to 40% in 1984 [5]. 
These massive increases in health expenditures from both the public and private 
sectors greatly exceeded the economy’s rate of inflation. Health care, as percentage of 
GNP went from 5.2% in 1965 to 10% in 1984. These expenditures were equivalent to a 
huge redistribution program, from the taxpayers to those working in the health sector. 
Early attempts at reducing the rise in health expenditures came from the federal 
government. Original expectations were that Medicare would cost only $2 billion a 
year. However, Medicare was an entitlement program, as such its benefits and benefi- 
ciaries were defined by law. It was considered politically impossible to ask Congress to 
change the law. That meant the federal government had only two alternatives for 
limiting the increase in its expenditures, which were rising by approximately 15% a 
year, increase taxes or limit payments to providers. 
The federal government started chipping away at the cost based reimbursement of 
hospitals in 1969, when it removed the 2% from the cost plus 2%. In 1971, because of 
rising inflation, President Nixon placed the entire U.S. economy under a wage and 
price freeze (the Economic Stabilization Program). The rest of the economy was 
removed from this freeze within one year, however, it remained in effect for the health 
sector until April 1974. Once it was removed, physician and hospital expenditures 
increased very rapidly, 17.5% and 19.4%, respectively [6]. 
Additional regulatory methods were tried to limit these rapid expenditure increases. 
Each one failed. Physician fee increases under Medicare were limited by the Medicare 
Fee Index; the result was that increasing numbers of physicians declined to participate 
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in the Medicare program while other physicians charged for additional services, 
thereby negating the effect of the fee freeze. Congress passed the National Health 
Planning and Resources Development Act in 1974 (CON) which placed limits on 
hospitals’ capital expenditures. Studies have since shown what many people expected, 
namely that the CON legislation had no effect on decreasing the rate of increase in 
hospital expenditures [7]. Utilization review programs (Professional Standard Review 
Organizations) were passed by the Congress in 1972. Again empirical studies failed to 
lind significant savings in hospital use or expenditures as a result of these programs [8]. 
Similar approaches were also tried by state governments to reduce their expendi- 
tures under Medicaid, and with similar results. 
In 1979 President Carter made hospital cost containment his highest legislative 
priority, His proposed legislation would have placed limits on the annual percent 
increase in hospital expenditures. The regulatory approach moved from the use of 
indirect methods, such as limits on capital expenditures (CON) and utilization 
(PSROs), to placing direct controls on hospital expenditures. 
President Carter suffered an important legislative defeat. The proposed cost 
containment legislation was too direct a threat to hospitals’ goals and revenues. 
Previous regulation, such as CON, was not only ineffective in preventing hospitals 
from expanding but it was also used to protect those same hospitals from competition 
[9]. Hospitals and the American Medical Association were instrumental in defeating 
President Carter’s cost containment legislation [lo]. At this point federal efforts to 
control the rise in federal health expenditures were stymied. 
Meanwhile a number of states began implementing their own rate review programs. 
These programs were, in many cases, assisted in the implementation and design by the 
state hospital associations themselves. Rather than have stringent rate controls im- 
posed at the federal level, many hospital spokesmen believed that their influence would 
be greater at the state level and that the resulting type of rate review program would be 
more considerate of individual hospital differences [ 111. 
By the late 197Os, it appeared that pressures to contain the rise in health expenditures 
would result in increased regulation. Rather than eliminate previous regulation as it 
proved ineffective, such as CON, additional regulations were proposed. Hospitals 
were to be subject to controls on their use, on their capital and operating expenditures, 
as well as on entry into each hospital’s market. Hospitals began to be talked about as 
though they were “public utilities” [12]. 
III. The emergence of market competition 
There were a number of events that provided the preconditions for market competi- 
tion but only one that made it possible to occur. 
A. Federal initiatives 
1. The increased supply of physicians For approximately 15 years, through 
the 1950s and early 196Os, the supply of physicians in relation to the population 
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remained constant, at 141 physicians per 100000. During this period physicians’ 
incomes were rising (relative to those of other occupations) as were the number of 
applicants to acceptances to medical schools. As the demand for physician’s services 
continued to grow, stimulated by the passage of Medicare and Medicaid and the 
growth of private health insurance, an increased number of foreign medical graduates 
(FMGs) came to the U.S. 
During this period there was constant talk of a shortage of physicians. There were 
many qualified U.S. students who could not gain admission to the limited number of 
medical school spaces who then went overseas to receive a medical education. There 
was great concern by middle class families that their sons and daughters could not 
become physicians while there was increased immigration by FMGs. The Congress 
responded to these constituent pressures and passed the Health Professions Educa- 
tional Assistance Act (HPEA). In reference to the reasons for the passage of the HPEA 
in 1963 Senator Yarborough stated, “It was when we were trying to give more 
American boys and girls a chance for a medical education, so that we would not have 
to drain the help of other foreign countries” [ 141. And again, “To me it is just shocking 
that we do not give American boys and girls a chance to obtain a medical education so 
that they can serve their own people”. It took a number of years before the full 
magnitude of this Act took effect. New medical schools were built and existing medical 
schools increased their spaces. (The same occurred for other health professions.) 
By 1980 the supply of physicians had reached 199 per 100 000, almost a 50% increase 
from the early 1960s. It is expected that by 1990 the supply of physicians will increase 
by a further 30%. 
Contrary to what many persons believed, the market for physicians does follow the 
laws of supply and demand. With the rapid increase in the supply of physicians, there 
has been a decrease in the number of visits per physician, real physician incomes have 
been declining over the past 5 years, there has been an increase in the number of 
physicians accepting Medicare assignment, and more physicians are locating in areas 
previously short of physicians. 
In response to their constituent interests and over the objections of the American 
Medical Association, Congress enacted legislation which eventually created excess 
capacity among physicians. It was not Congress’ intention to create competition 
among physicians. However, their actions in passing the HPEA set the stage for it. 
2. Cost containment legislation There was beginning to be a recognition in 
Congress that something had to be done to halt the rise in federal health expenditures, 
if for no other reason than Congress might be forced to raise taxes or impose costs on 
the beneficiaries of Medicare and Medicaid. Some of the opponents of President 
Carter’s cost containment legislation, such as Rep. Gephardt and Stockman, began to 
propose an alternative approach, the use of market competition. Various academi- 
cians also wrote on the virtues of competition. Health interest groups, however, such 
as the AMA, opposed all of the competitive approaches. 
The Congress did move slightly in the direction of competition, In 1979 Congress 
amended the CON legislation so that the Act should not be used to inhibit competition 
[15]. (Many states, however, still use CON in an anti-competitive manner, denying 
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entry by free standing surgi-centers and attempting to reduce the bed capacity of small 
lower cost hospitals.) [16]. 
When Congress passed the HMO Act in 1973, it included two provisions helpful to 
the development of HMOs and one that was a hindrance. Employers with 25 or more 
employees had to offer their employees an HMO option if there was a federally 
qualified HMO available in their area. Second, federally qualified HMOs were exempt 
from restrictive state practices. A reason often mentioned by survey respondents for 
not choosing an HMO is that there was a lack of information about how such an 
organization delivers care. Mandating an HMO option through the workplace enables 
a federally qualified HMO to provide this information in a low cost manner [17]. 
In the initial HMO legislation, federally qualified HMOs were required to offer a set 
of benefits that generally exceeded the benefits offered by their competition, the 
traditional plans. As a result of this requirement, few HMOs opted to become federally 
qualified. This restriction was eased in subsequent amendments to the HMO Act. 
HMOs initially had a small competitive effect. They represented a small percentage 
of the market and there was limited premium competition. HMOs generally set their 
premium equal to that of the traditional plan and tried to attract subscribers by 
offering additional benefits. Without premium competition, however, employers did 
not save money when their employees joined the HMO. However, as the market share 
of HMOs increased, the decreased hospital use of their subscribers added to hospitals’ 
excess capacity. 
Except for the change in the CON legislation and the enactment of the HMO Act 
and its amendments, it was difficult for Congress to develop a consensus with the 
various health interest groups as to what legislative approach, if any, should be 
proposed to resolve the problem of rising federal health expenditures. 
It was not until several years later, under President Reagan, that additional cost 
containment legislation was enacted. In 198 1 Congress amended the Medicaid Act [ 181 
to permit states greater flexibility in how they pay for their medically indigent. States 
were no longer required to offer their medically indigent “free choice” of medical 
provider. This meant that states could now contract with selected providers for the 
care of their medically indigent. While a potentially powerful force for using market 
forces in the Medicaid program, many states moved slowly. 
Then, early in the Reagan Administration, a revolutionary method was introduced 
to pay hospitals under Medicare. The hospitals and medical associations were pow- 
erless to prevent a Republican Administration from reducing federal expenditures on 
hospitals. 
Payment of hospitals according to Diagnostic Related Groupings (DRGs) was 
phased in over a 4-year period starting in September 1983. Hospitals were now paid a 
fixed price per admission for the care of their Medicare patients. The incentives facing 
hospitals changed. It was now in the economic interest of hospitals to provide less 
rather than more services. Lengths of stay for the elderly began to decline. Medicare 
patients, who now represented approximately 40% of the hospitals’ patient days, 
began to be discharged earlier from the hospital. From September 1982 to September 
1983 Medicare patient days increased 2.0%. In the following year, 1983-1984, Medi- 
care patient days decreased 8.9%. The decrease in patient days was getting larger since 
in the last quarter of that year the decline was 13.0% [19]. 
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However, by the time hospitals began to experience the impact of DRCs on their 
occupancy rates, the move toward market competition had already started. DRGs 
reinforced the competitive pressures on hospitals stimulated several years earlier 
by declining occupancy rates. 
6. Private sector initiatives 
Approximately two-thirds of the population are in the private sector; and most 
private health insurance is purchased through the workplace. The stimulus for compe- 
tition started in the private sector. 
In 1981 private industry was faced with a severe recession. In addition, import 
competition from foreign producers increased, particularly for automobiles and steel. 
The recession led to unemployment, loss of income, a decrease in health insurance 
benefits, and a decline in elective hospital admissions. The recession also led to lower 
tax revenues for states. As a consequence many states cut back on their Medicaid 
benefits, decreased the numbers of eligibles, and instituted cost containment measures, 
such as prior authorization for admission. A decline in the hospital admission rate for 
those under 65 years of age started in late 1981. 
Once the recession was over, business was still concerned with its labor costs. The 
strength of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies forced business to reduce its 
costs wherever possible to remain competitive. Thus the decline in the admission rate 
continued. From being relatively stable, the admission rate for those under 65 years of 
age declined 2.5% from September 1982 to September 1983. Then from September 
1983 to September 1984 the decline in the admission rate increased to 4.5%. Since 
length of stay also declined, the decrease in patient days over those 2 years was 4.0% 
and 7.9%, respectively [20]. 
As industry attempted to reduce its labor costs, health insurance benefits came 
under greater scrutiny. Industry placed greater pressure on health insurers and an 
increasing number of firms started their own self insurance plans. The firms believed 
that they, rather than insurance companies, would be better able to control their 
employees’ health care use. Other firms joined Health Care Coalitions in their area. 
These coalitions collected data on the use rates and charges of different providers to 
determine those providers who were most costly. Businesses also started to impose 
deductibles and coinsurance on their employees, thereby increasing their employees’ 
price sensitivity. A survey of 1185 companies found that the percentage of firms 
requiring deductible payments for their employees’ inpatient care rose from 30% in 
1982 to 63% in 1984 [21]. 
One of the most important changes firms (or insurance companies on their behalf) 
introduced was benefit redesign. Insurance coverage for lower cost substitutes to 
hospitals was introduced. Previously, even though it was less costly to perform surgery 
in an outpatient setting, if this service was not covered by insurance then it became less 
costly to the employee to have the surgery performed in a hospital. 
Private sector initiatives had two effects. First, as purchasers of health care benefits 
they demonstrated that they were concerned with health care costs. This price incen- 
tive on the demand side of the market was transmitted to the health insurers. Insurers 
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became more concerned with utilization review of providers. Pre-authorization for 
admission, concurrent review, and second opinions for surgery were instituted as a 
means of reducing the insurance premium. Insurers, particularly the Blues, began to 
change their relationship with providers and became more adversarial. They began to 
place greater pressure on hospitals to limit their cost increases. As competition among 
insurers increased, so did the type of plans that they offered. Insurers began to form 
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs). PPOs and HMOs restricted employees’choice of provider in return for either 
increased benefits or lower insurance premiums. 
The second consequence of the changes in the private sector was that hospitals 
developed excess capacity. The efforts to reduce hospital utilization, such as utilization 
controls, the growth of HMOs, and coverage of care in non-hospital settings were 
succeeding. The occupancy rates in non-federal, non-profit, short term general hospi- 
tals declined from 78.2% in 1980 to 67.7% for the year ending September 1984. The 
trend is continuing down as evidenced by the occupancy rate for the month of 
September, which was 64.1% [22]. As excess capacity increased, hospitals became 
involved with HMOs and PPOs. Subscribers to HMOs and PPOs were locked in to 
those providers. Providers not participating in those organizational arrangements 
only had access to a declining population base. With increasing excess capacity, 
hospitals began forming their own PPOs and joining HMOs. 
Traditional forms of market competition soon started, such as hospital discounts to 
HMOs, PPOs offering businesses lower prices, and advertising by providers as well as 
by HMOs and insurers. 
The change by Medicare to paying hospitals by DRGs, and private contracting by 
Medicaid, reinforced the incentives facing hospitals in the private sector. The pressure 
on hospitals to compete increased as the utilization by the elderly and the poor 
declined. 
C. The enforcement of anti-trust laws to the health sector 
Increased concern by business with their employees’ health care costs and the 
creation of excess capacity among physicians and hospitals were important pre-condi- 
tions for competition. However, had it not been for the application of the anti-trust 
laws, it is unlikely that market competition would have occurred. 
CON legislation had encouraged anti-competitive behavior. Planning agencies, by 
attempting to eliminate duplication of hospital facilities and equipment, created 
monopoly power. Medical societies and State Practice Acts inhibited market competi- 
tion by limiting advertising, fee-splitting, corporate practice, and delegation of tasks. 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield maintained the principle of “free choice” of provider; that 
is, their subscribers had no incentive to choose between providers on the basis of price. 
Blue Cross enrollees had a Service Benefit policy. Regardless of whether the partici- 
pating hospital had high or low costs, Blue Cross paid 100% of those costs. Under 
Blue Shield, price comparisons by enrollees were also discouraged; Blue Shield reim- 
bursed participating physicians in full according to their usual fees. 
Up until 1975 there was the belief that the anti-trust laws did not apply to “learned 
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professions” such as the health professions. In 1975 the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
the case of Goldberg vs. Virginia State Bar. The local Bar association, believing that 
lawyers were not engaged in “trade or commerce”, established a minimum fee sche- 
dule for lawyers. The Supreme Court ruled against any sweeping exclusion for the 
learned professions. In another important precedent, the Supreme Court in 1978 ruled 
against The National Society of Professional Engineers. The Court denied the use of 
anti-competitive behavior even if it represented a threat to either the profession’s ethics 
or to public safety. Encouraged by the Supreme Court decisions, the Federal Trade 
Association (FTC) began to vigorously enforce the anti-trust laws in the health field. 
The FTC, in 1975, charged the American Medical Association and its constituent 
medical societies with anti-competitive behavior. In a 1978 decision, the FTC prevail- 
ed. The AMA then appealed to the Supreme Court. The FTC again prevailed in the 
Court’s decision, rendered in 1982. 
The Supreme Court’s decision was a clear signal to health providers that they would 
now be subject to the anti-trust laws. 
The AMA and other professional associations made one last attempt to escape the 
jurisdiction of the FTC. The AMA led a lobbying effort in Congress to exempt state 
regulated professions from the jurisdiction of the FTC. It was reported by one AMA 
lobbyist that this light was the most important issue to the AMA since its fight against 
Medicare in 1965 [23]. 
The AMA was able to gather 219 co-sponsors to their bill in the House of Represen- 
tatives placing a moratorium on the FTC’s jurisdiction. The AMA stated position was 
“The standards of quality established by the American Medical Association and other 
medical societies . . . are being undermined by a federal agency that possesses no 
medical qualifications” [24]. The AMA was further concerned that they have to spend 
large sums of money defending themselves when those funds could be better spent on 
public interest functions. 
The AMA was successful in the House but was defeated in the U.S. Senate. It is 
useful to review the reasons for the AMA’s defeat because it was contrary to expecta- 
tions. Previously, the AMA had been very successful at both the federal and state 
legislatures; the AMA and its state societies had been (and still are) the largest 
contributor by a health association to legislators [25]. 
Although the AMA attempted to portray the legislation as one of preventing the 
FTC from “meddling” in quality of medical care, it was quickly viewed by others as 
being in the self interest of its proponents. While lawyers would also have been one of 
the state regulated professions exempted from the FTC’s jurisdiction, the “. . . Ameri- 
can Bar Association’s anti-trust section urged lawyers to oppose exemption, calling it a 
special-interest ploy that would injure consumers” [26]. Still others said that the AMA 
was more interested in placing the economic health of its members above the nation’s 
physical health [27]. The press also began to pick up the story. An analysis of campaign 
contributions by health PACs prepared by Congress Watch stimulated new articles, 
editorials around the country, and a commentary by Bill Moyers on the CBS Evening 
News (May 18, 1982). The opponents of the legislation were able to generate “. . . the 
rarest of political weapons - public opinion” [28]. Legislators became wary of sup- 
porting what was being seen by the public as special interest legislation. 
Other organizations also opposed the AMA and the bill’s proponents. The Wash- 
ington Businessmen’s Group on Health, which represents nearly 200 of the Fortune 
500 companies, believed the legislation would increase the cost of their employees’ 
health insurance. After a recent event, the American Nurses Association decided it 
wanted the FTC’s protection, Under the pressure of local medical societies, certain 
rural clinics, where nurse practitioners were working under the supervision of physi- 
cians, were closed when the insurance companies revoked the malpractice insurance of 
the participating physicians [29]. These and more than 30 other organizations formed 
a coalition to defeat the bill restricting the FTC. They stimulated grass roots support 
through TV programs, newspaper editorials, and articles on the Ed-Op pages. 
Despite the above publicity and grass roots pressure, the bill passed by a large 
margin in the House of Representatives, 245/155. Apparently, Congressmen’s con- 
tinual needs for campaign contributions carried the day for the bill’s proponents. 
Members of the Senate, however, do not run for re-election every 2 years and are 
therefore more independent. The bill was defeated in the Senate, 59137. 
No longer could professional associations inhibit competition. The FTC was able to 
bring suit to prevent physician and dentist boycotts against insurers (Michigan State 
Medical Society and the Indiana Federation of Dentists), prevent physicians from 
denying hospital privileges to physicians participating in prepaid health plans (Forbes 
Health System Medical Staff), enabled advertising to be used (FTC vs. AMA), 
opposed the per se rule against exclusive contracts (Hyde Case), and enabled Preferred 
Provider Organizations and HMOs to compete [30]. 
D. Summary of reasons for the emergence of market forces 
As a result of the 1981 recession and severe import competition, business became 
more concerned with the cost of their employees’ health insurance premiums. This 
pressure by business to hold down the rising cost of insurance premiums created the 
necessary incentives for insurance companies to provide changes in their benefit 
packages. Low cost substitutes to hospital care, increased cost sharing by employees, 
and the use of HMOs and PPOs, resulted in lower admissions rates and lengths of stay 
in hospitals. Businesses, and insurance companies responding to their demands, 
became more price conscious and concerned with decreasing use of the most costly 
component of health care, the hospital. 
HMOs, which for years were unable to attract sufficient numbers of physicians, now 
found it easier as a result of the increased supply of physicians. HMOs also found it 
easier to market their services as companies offered their employees dual choice 
options. Providers, such as physicians, formed their own prepaid health plans (IPAs) 
to prevent being limited to a shrinking fee-for-service market. Insurance companies 
started to form their own prepaid plans and PPOs as they saw the market for these 
plans increasing. 
Hospital occupancy rates declined as a result of these measures by the private sector. 
When DRGs were instituted, occupancy rates declined still further. To survive hospi- 
tals had to compete for shares in a declining market. Hospitals also had to seek new 
sources of revenue. The effect was that hospitals had to become part of PPOs and 
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HMOs for fear of being excluded from these markets. They also offered discounts to 
larger purchasers and started advertising. To secure new sources of revenue, hospitals 
became providers of substitute (to hospitals) services, such as outpatient surgery, 
home care, hospices, etc. The existence of these services and insurance coverage for 
their payment served to further decrease the demand for inpatient care. 
The excess capacity among physicians and hospitals and the change in business 
incentives were important pre-conditions for market competition. However, it is 
unlikely that market competition would have occurred had it not been for the applica- 
bility and enforcement of the anti-trust laws. In a previous time, with similar pre-con- 
ditions, anti-competitive behavior by physician associations was able to prevent the 
emergence of market competition. In the 1930s excess capacity existed among physi- 
cians. However, prepaid plans and efforts by insurance companies to institute cost 
control measures were thwarted by actions of local medical societies [31-341. 
As the health sector moves toward market competition and innovation, a number of 
state governments still do not recognize the changes that are occurring. Some states are 
still attempting to develop all-payer rate review systems that will prevent hospitals 
from offering discounts to different purchasers. These approaches are equivalent to 
price fixing agreements among all providers. Many states use CON statutes to prevent 
providers from entering markets. They also use bed reduction programs to eliminate 
excess bed capacity so as to protect existing large hospitals. However, it is unlikely that 
state regulation will be able to prevent the move to market competition. The pressures 
by business for lower premiums and the applicability of the anti-trust laws will be too 
great for many states to resist. 
IV. The changing structure of the medical care delivery system 
The above discussion stated the reasons for the emergence of market competition in 
what was previously a highly regulated market. The next issue of interest is the likely 
outcome of market competition in health care. To provide some indication as to how 
the medical care delivery system is likely to change, it is first necessary to discuss the 
determinants of market structure. 
The market structure of an industry is defined by the number and size of firms within 
a market. In some industries, such as automobiles, there are few firms with each being 
quite large. In other industries, such as barbershops, there are many small firms. In still 
other industries there are different sized firms; an example of this latter case is the 
airlines. The importance of knowing the likely market structure of an industry is that it 
may affect the industry’s performance. When there are many firms, each with a small 
market share, then they are faced with a great deal of competitive pressure. When there 
are few firms, each with large market shares, then the pricing policies of the firm may 
be higher in relation to their costs, efficiency may not be as high, there may be a greater 
emphasis on non-price competition, a greater emphasis on advertising, and there is 
likely to be a higher rate of technological change [35]. 
The main determinant of the number and size of firms in a competitive industry is 
which size of firm is most efficient. This relationship between cost and size is referred to 
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as “economies of scale” and differs for each industry. If there are no barriers to 
entering or exiting from an industry, then each firm will strive to take advantage of any 
economies of scale that may exist in order to survive. If a firm can not compete at the 
same price as a more efficient firm then it will either merge with other firms or go out of 
business. 
In the past the structure of the health care industry was not determined solely by 
economies of scale. Legal (or regulatory) and financing methods also determined the 
structure of this industry. And many of these regulations negated the importance of 
economies of scale in the delivery of medical services. Of what use was it if a lower cost 
delivery system could be developed, but was it illegal? 
The stated reasons for many of the legal restrictions was to enhance the quality of 
care and to protect the public. Cynics, however, believed that the profession was better 
protected than the public. The effect of these restrictions was to have fewer providers, 
higher prices, and less innovation in the delivery of medical services. 
As many of the legal restrictions have been swept away by the anti-trust laws, and as 
methods of financing medical services have changed, economies of scale are becoming 
a more important determinant of the industry’s market structure. 
Medical services, however, do not conform to the requirements for a strictly 
competitive industry. The product, medical services, is not a standard service. Con- 
sumers of medical care place different values on different aspects of that service. For 
example, some types of delivery systems are viewed by the patient as being more 
restrictive in their choice of provider. For some medical services, patients are often 
willing to pay more to go to providers that are located closer. Still other patients place a 
greater value on the manner in which the provider dispenses care, i.e., the concern 
expressed by the provider and the amount of time devoted to a visit. 
The reason for this discussion is to suggest that consumers may be willing to pay 
more for medical care or for health insurance than would be offered by the lowest cost, 
most restrictive provider. As long as consumer tastes vary, a variety of delivery systems 
(and types of providers within each delivery system) would be expected to co-exist in a 
competitive market [36]. Thus one characteristic of the emerging market structure 
would be the existence of different “products” or delivery systems being offered. 
In the new competitive environment, it is likely that a single provider or insurer 
would offer alternative delivery systems. If the extent of economies of scale is 
sufficiently large, then an organization can take advantage of these cost savings by 
expanding into related product lines. For example, a particular firm could offer or 
participate in the traditional fee-for-service delivery system, also participate in prepaid 
health plans, and be a PPO organization as well. Thus an insurance company would 
attempt to segment its market by offering different products to each segment of the 
market. In addition to the above three approaches, an insurer would also attempt to go 
after those firms that self insure by offering Administrative Service Contracts only. 
The capability of providers and insurers for delivering their services is similar 
regardless of the delivery system used. 
How large any one provider or insurer group will become depends on the nature of 
economies of scale. It appears that there are very large savings as health organizations 
increase in size. Joint purchasing arrangements have been one method by which 
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hospitals have achieved such savings. Hospitals have formed affiliations with one 
another for the purpose of taking advantage of these types of economies. To take 
advantage of other cost savings, however, requires a common ownership arrangement 
rather than a loose affiliation. Malpractice insurance, advertising, support systems 
such as data processing, and access to the capital markets are a few such examples. 
Initially, hospitals started taking advantage of economies of scale by forming loose 
affiliations with one another. As the competitiveness of the industry increased, hospi- 
tals began merging and forming large corporate chains. The next step was to go beyond 
horizontal mergers and vertically integrate. There were two reasons for this. First, the 
revenue opportunities for horizontal integration became limited. As the demand for 
hospital care declined, the number of financially viable hospitals also declined. The 
second reason was the result of third party payment systems. As the federal govern- 
ment and private insurers tried to reduce their expenditures, less costly substitutes to 
hospitals became reimbursable. Hospitals then became providers of these substitute 
services, e.g., hospices, outpatient surgery centers, nursing homes, and home care. 
Hospitals also moved into providing complementary services, such as retirement 
centers and other services to the aged. 
Once a hospital chain became vertically integrated, it diversified its product lines. To 
keep its facilities occupied, hospitals began competing in the PPO market and affil- 
iating with HMOs. 
Apparently, the latest trend is toward increased vertical integration. Insurance 
companies are forming and even purchasing their own delivery systems, such as HMOs 
and PPOs. In turn, large hospital chains are purchasing insurance companies. The 
hospital chains, facing declining occupancy rates, believe that they can direct increased 
business to their own hospitals by marketing health insurance to business firms. 
A very recent development has been the announced merger between the largest 
hospital chain, Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) and the largest hospital 
supplier, American Hospital Supply. The reaction by investors to this news was 
negative; the stock prices of both companies declined. Growth of the hospital supply 
industry has leveled off, particularly since DRGs have been instituted and hospital 
occupancy has fallen. The hospital supply industry is also considered to be very price 
competitive, thus it is not clear that HCA will receive reduced supply prices as a result 
of the merger. However, the main reason stated by the two companies for the merger is 
the greater access to capital as a result of using the combined assets of both companies. 
Thus in the medical marketplace, increased size per se may not be that desirable 
unless it is also accompanied by economies of scale. It appears that the complementari- 
ty of products as well as economies of scale, particularly with respect to capital, may be 
the twin criteria of what the optimal size of the health care firm is likely to be. 
The structure of the market is moving in the direction of several very large chains, 
which offer their services in different markets, both horizontal as well as vertical. The 
health care corporation of the future is likely to have branches all over the country; it 
will be vertically integrated - offering the entire spectrum of care, from wellness centers 
to acute care to retirement centers. It will compete in different segments of the 
consumer market, from fee-for-service to alternative delivery systems. And it will 
underwrite insurance as well as provide medical and other services. 
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V. The implications of market competition in health care 
A. The implications to health professionals 
The best illustration as to how the new market environment is performing is to 
examine the twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul [37]. By 1984, after relatively few 
years in existence, prepaid health plans in this area have signed up 36% of the market. 
As HMO market shares have increased, physicians in private practice have formed 
their own prepaid plans so as not to be excluded from the prepaid market. The intense 
competition among prepaid plans and between prepaid plans and the traditional plans 
has resulted in decreased hospital utilization. And because of their excess capacity, 
hospitals have started to compete on price, offering discounts to HMOs. With excess 
capacity among providers, new delivery systems are forming, such as PPOs, which are 
a form of price competition. 
Facing decreased demand for their services, the hospitals in turn have decreased 
their demand for nurses. A recent strike by nurses against hospitals concerned the issue 
of layoffs and job security, rather than increased wages. 
Physicians are experiencing decreased demand for their services and are changing 
their practice styles to become more competitive. Both hospitals and HMOs now use 
computers to monitor physician performance. Physicians participating in prepaid 
plans, even plans of their own, find that they must now conform to the plan’s 
utilization guidelines. 
These are only some of the consequences of market competition to health profes- 
sionals. In many places physicians are finding that they must also learn how to market 
their practices and even consider advertising, a practice many physicians consider 
beneath the dignity of their profession. Physicians also find themselves in competition 
with hospitals over ambulatory care services, as hospitals develop their own ambulato- 
ry care clinics. With the increased supply of physicians and the growth of HMOs, many 
more physicians are becoming salaried employees. Physicians have also come in 
conflict with one another. As physicians find themselves with extra time, they are 
trying to expand the services they offer by performing services previously performed 
by other specialists. 
Health professionals are also engaged in intense political competition among them- 
selves. Each health profession attempts to use the State Practice Acts to increase the 
tasks they perform while preventing other professions from encroaching on their tasks. 
Thus optometrists are in competition with opthalmologists, obstetricians with nurse 
midwives, family practitioners with nurse practitioners, psychologists with psychia- 
trists, and podiatrists with orthopedic surgeons. 
One response to increased competition has been to seek protection through the 
legislative process. Nurses, for example, are in the forefront of the movement to 
establish pay scales according to the concept of “comparable worth”. Comparable 
worth goes beyond the already established legal principle of equal pay for equal work; 
the new concept is now equal pay for work of comparable value. Even if the work is not 
similar, such as a nurse and an electrician, or even a physician, if the work is of 
comparable value, then the pay should be equal. 
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Comparable worth seeks to substitute pay-finding commissions for the market 
system. There are currently a number of law suits that have as their goal the implementa- 
tion of the comparable worth doctrine. There is also a movement in the Congress to 
legislate this concept if it is rejected by the courts. It is often during periods of economic 
hardship that interest groups seek to insulate themselves from competitive pressures. 
The attractiveness of a career in medicine or other health profession has declined. 
Not only are the prospects for future income diminished but the costs of becoming a 
physician have been increasing. Tuition to medical and dental schools has been rising 
as federal and state support has declined. 
Clearly, the increased supply of health professionals, the applicability of the anti- 
trust laws, and market competition, have had an adverse impact on the economic 
outlook and practice styles of health professionals. It is therefore not surprising that 
health associations such as the American Medical Association have been so opposed to 
market competition, And, unfortunately for physicians, it does not appear that these 
market conditions will change in the near future. 
6. Implications for the public 
The introduction of market competition to health care carries with it both positive 
and negative consequences. 
On the positive side, the public now has greater choice of delivery systems. Those 
willing to limit their choice of provider, such as HMOs, can have lower out-of-pocket 
costs for medical care. There is also a great deal more innovation in methods for 
delivering medical services. Same day outpatient surgery, hospices, and home care, are 
examples of alternative methods of providing care that were previously provided in the 
hospital. Providers have become more responsive to the public’s preferences. For 
example, as more parents want to give birth in their own home and/or use nurse 
midwives, hospitals have responded with “birthing rooms”, to simulate home condi- 
tions. 
The price of medical services is likely to increase at a lower rate. Increased concern 
by business over employee health costs and premium competition among insurers is 
resulting in greater efficiency in the provision of medical services. Hospitals must be 
efficient if they are to be price competitive to HMOs, or if they want to form a PPO. 
DRGs also provide hospitals with these same incentives. The cost of duplicated 
facilities can no longer be passed on to third party payers. There is also increased 
attention to managerial controls. Hospitals are developing computer profiles on their 
physicians to determine whether they are prescribing too many tests or not discharging 
their patients soon enough. 
There has always been a concern that quality of care would suffer under a price 
competitive system. There is the fear that some physicians would engage in unethical 
behavior to increase their incomes. Or that HMOs and other providers would now 
have an incentive to provide fewer services. It is too early to document the effect of 
market competition on quality. However, there are several reasons why these concerns 
may be unwarranted. 
To lower their marketing costs, HMOs and PPOs are attempting to enroll employees 
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directly at the workplace. As such, these alternative delivery systems must be approved 
either by the union or by the company. Further, there is increased sophistication today 
with computerized claims processing. Insurers, businesses themselves, as well as the 
provider organizations are using such systems to monitor costs and appropriateness of 
utilization. It has become easier to detect poor quality and such instances are likely to 
cost the HMO or PPO their business at that employer. Poor quality care does not make 
good business sense. 
Malpractice insurance premiums, after rising very rapidly in the 1970s and then 
leveling off for the last several years, are once again rising rapidly. Many large provider 
organizations are attempting to lower their insurance rates through self-insurance or 
by bearing more of the risk themselves. However, all organizations are re-examining 
their quality assurance programs to determine how they can better improve their 
experience. There is likely to be greater emphasis on quality of care for those providers 
that are part of larger groups or that participate in alternative delivery systems. 
The negative effects of price competition are likely to be found in the non-employer 
group business. It is both more difficult for the purchaser to detect poor quality and the 
cost to the provider from under-service are less. 
Under Medicare DRGs, hospitals receive the same price regardless of how much 
service they provide. While it is too early to document the effects of fixed prices on 
hospital incentives, there is talk among health professionals of patients being dis- 
charged too early. Some of the costs of care have been shifted to the patient, their 
family, or to another insurer as when the patient is discharged to a nursing home. 
The most severe consequences of competition, however, are with respect to the poor. 
Medicaid programs have been reducing the amount they pay hospitals for their 
medically indigent. As hospitals began facing strong budgetary pressures from other 
payers, a number of hospitals believed they could not subsidize the care of high cost 
indigent patients. If the expected cost of caring for a Medicaid patient is likely to 
exceed the reimbursement, some hospitals are refusing to admit such patients. This 
problem, referred to as “dumping”, is receiving greater attention in the media [38]. 
Inadequate care to the poor has arisen because many states do not pay a sufficiently 
high price to cover the costs of their poor. Even if a state paid a price which was on 
average sufficient to cover the costs of their care, the price would still be below the costs 
of their high cost patients. A hospital still has the incentive to “dump” the high cost 
patients. Since some states do not reimburse at a rate even to cover the costs of care on 
average, more of the poor get refused admission to certain hospitals. 
Public hospitals, including those teaching hospitals operated by state governments, 
receive more of the patients refused admission at other hospitals [39]. These hospitals 
find themselves disadvantaged if they are forced to compete while subsidizing the costs 
of patients refused by their competitors. 
The lack of adequate payment by many state Medicaid programs is raising concern 
that the U.S. is returning to a two-class medical system. 
Several approaches have been suggested to resolve the issue of uncompensated care 
for the poor. If the state’s payments are on average sufficient to cover the costs of care 
for the poor, then to eliminate the problem of preferred risk selection by providers, the 
state should contract with HMOs on a capitation basis. HMOs should be willing to 
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compete for this business, as long as the capitation payment is on average sufficient to 
cover their costs. The Congress has already given states the flexibility to remove free 
choice of provider under Medicaid programs [40]. The public also finds this approach 
acceptable [41]. 
It is likely that an increasing number of states will develop bidding procedures for 
capitation contracts. A similar process, on a voluntary basis, will be started this year 
for Medicare patients. Both of these types of programs will further stimulate the 
movement toward HMOs. 
Capitation contracts, however, will not work in those states where there is inade- 
quate payment for the poor. If a state is unwilling to spend sufficient funds for the care 
of its poor, then a competitive system will not provide that care. The problem is not 
with the competitive system but with the state. In those states where these situations 
exist, providers themselves have proposed new state legislation. They have proposed 
that all hospitals should be taxed to pay for uncompensated care provided by the few 
hospitals. The alternative would be to provide the care through capitation systems. 
Competition eliminates cross subsidies. Other payers will go elsewhere if a provider 
bills them for the costs of others. Unless government payments for the aged and 
medically indigent are sufficient to cover their costs of care, hospitals will be dis- 
charging these patients too soon or these patients will be shifted to other providers, 
namely the public hospitals. While one outcome of a competitive system is increased 
efficiency, another is that the manner in which the poor are financed and pro- 
vided for becomes more obvious and requires society to make explicit choices on how 
we wish to provide for them. 
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